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Abstract—The paper studies the problem of constructing
assurance cases for embedded control systems developed using
a model-based approach. Assurance cases aim to provide a
convincing argument that the system delivers certain guarantees, based on the evidence obtained during the design and
evaluation of the system. We suggest an argument strategy
centered around properties of models used in the development
and properties of tools that manipulate these models. The paper
presents the case study of a resilient speed estimator for an
autonomous ground vehicle and takes the reader through a
detailed assurance case arguing that the estimator computes
speed estimates with bounded error.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are often deployed in critical environments, where human life and safety, as well
as success of expensive missions, depend on the system
being able to perform its functions in adverse conditions
that are hard to predict in advance. These adverse conditions
may include faults, unpredictable environments, or malicious
activity. To succeed, the system must be designed to be
resilient to these conditions. A substantial fraction of CPS
design efforts are spent of establishing and guaranteeing
resilience.
As CPS become more and more complex, providing such
resilience guarantees is more and more difficult. Rigorous
model-based design techniques, extensive verification and
validation (V&V) are all necessary to ensure resilience.
However, these activities need to be performed in a concerted fashion to make sure that all efforts are consistent
and nothing important is missed. Design and V&V activities yield large amount of artifacts – such as requirement
specifications, test and verification results, design reviews,
etc., – that can serve as evidence that the system achieves
the desired goals. However, evaluating consistency between
different evidence items and any potential gaps is a daunting task that requires a deep understanding of the system
requirements, its intended requirements, design approaches,
etc. Assumptions made in the process of design and V&V
are critical for proper understanding of the available evidence.

In a large CPS design project, when a large team is
engaged in design and V&V activities it can be difficult
to maintain a centralized, coherent view of the system and
its associated evidence in all its detail. It can be even more
difficult to communicate this view to regulators who need
to evaluate the system for safety and grant permission for
its use. Assurance cases have been proposed as means to
organize the evidence into a coherent argument that captures
what evidence is available, what assumptions have been
made in the design process, how each piece of evidence
contributes to the overall assurance, etc.
There is no clear understanding yet, however, how to
build an assurance case for a given resilience property,
combining together arguments performed at different levels
of abstraction and using different reasoning techniques. In
this paper, we consider a case study of one component in a
resilient control system, namely a resilient speed estimator
(RSE) for an autonomous ground vehicle. We construct a
detailed assurance case for the component that covers both
a mathematical model of the state estimator and its physical
environment, as well as a software implementation of the
state estimation algorithm. The purpose of the case study
is to gain understanding of what levels of modeling are
involved in the design and implementation of a control
system, what reasoning techniques are used at each level,
and what assumptions are likely to be made at each level, as
well as how these assumptions can be justified by guarantees
established in a lower-level model. While the models considered in the case study are specific to the control system
and its intended deployment platform, we believe that the
modeling levels and assumptions encountered on each level
in this case study are typical of many other CPS control
problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
the concept of assurance cases and discusses the main
strategy employed in the development of our assurance case.
Section III describes the robotic platform and the problem of
resilient state estimation. Section IV presents the assurance
case for the RSE. We conclude with a discussion of our
approach to the assurance case construction, and the role of
the assurance case in the context of the whole vehicle.
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II. A SSURANCE CASES
In a straightforward generalization from [1], we define
an assurance case as a documented body of evidence that
provides a convincing and valid argument that a system has
desired critical properties for a given application in a given
environment. A common example of such a critical property
is system safety, in which case the argument is known as a
safety case.
A commonly used notation for expressing assurance cases
is Goal-Structuring Notation (GSN) [2]. In GSN, the argument is represented graphically. A goal node states the claim
in an argument, a strategy node decomposes the further
argument into sub-claims. Alternatively, an evidence node
can refer to a direct support for the claim. There are also
special nodes to express assumptions and context for the
argument. In this paper, we use a similar notation. However,
in our case study, all claims (except where noted) are using
the same strategy, which is described below. To avoid duplication and simplify visual representation of the argument,
we therefore do not use strategy nodes and connect the
claim nodes directly to their sub-claims. Where needed, the
strategy is described in the text. Nodes used in argument
fragments in this paper are summarized in Figure 1.
Model-manipulation strategy: Throughout the argument, we rely on what we call a model-manipulation strategy. The structure of the argument is visually illustrated in
Figure 2. This strategy is related to the from-to assurance
case pattern, described in [3], that targets generative modelbased development methods and is a simplified, one-step
application of the same idea. In our case, we make a claim
about the application of an analysis algorithm or some other
transformation to a given model. This application may be
subject to additional assumptions. For example, we apply
discretization to a continuous-time model. In order to claim
that the discrete-time model accurately describes the real

LandShark vehicle

system, we need to show that discretization is correctly
performed, under the assumption about sampling rates of
sensors on the platform, and that the continuous-time model
was accurate, in the first place. We thus obtain two subclaims. The first one, which we refer to as the technique
sub-claim, is about the application of the technique. It does
not need further argument and appeals to the evidence about
the technique, such as proofs of the algorithm or tool qualifications. The second sub-claim, called the model sub-claim,
is about the model itself. We may have to further extend
the argument that the claim about the model is justified.
The model-manipulation strategy can be applied iteratively,
where the model sub-claim is again argued using the same
strategy. In Section IV, we will present an assurance case
constructed in this way.
III. C ASE STUDY
A. Problem definition and design approach
We study the construction of assurance cases in the
context of a resilient cruise control system of LandShark 1 ,
a fully electric Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) shown in
Figure 3. In our scenario, the operator specifies the desired
vehicle speed, while the on-board control has to ensure
that the desired speed is maintained, even in the presence
of malicious activity aimed to disrupt the operation of the
vehicle. A crucial part of the control system is a state
estimator, which receives inputs from sensors and fuses
multiple streams to derive an estimate for the system state.
In our case study, the only state variable is vehicle speed.
Speed readings can be obtained from wheel odometry and
GPS sensors.
In this work, we consider attacks on sensor data, which
result in wrong values being delivered to the state estimator.
These attacks may be external to the vehicle, resulting
from sensor spoofing, or internal, when the attacker can
manipulate messages on the vehicle bus.
1 See

http://www.blackirobotics.com/LandShark UGV UC0M.html.

B. Resilient speed estimation
The estimation of the vehicle speed is performed following the technique presented in [4], which follows closely
the seminal work in [5] and [6], where recent results on
error correction over the reals and compressed sensing are
used to derive secure state estimators when system sensors
or actuators are under attack [7].
In [4] it is shown that the state (speed) can be estimated
using N sensors measured at M time steps as the solution
to the following minimization problem
arg min kEkl0
E,x

(1)

s.t. |Y − φ(x, U) − E| ≤ ∆
where x is the state to be estimated, U are the applied
actuator inputs, Y ∈ <N ×M represents a matrix of meaN ×M
surements, φ maps x and U onto <M ×N , ∆ ∈ <+
has
elements corresponding to the worst-case sensor uncertainty
bounds, and E ∈ <N ×M denotes a matrix with non-zero
entries corresponding to the estimated sensor attack values.
Each row of Y (and likewise E) corresponds to one of the
N sensors, such that the objective in (1) is equivalent to
minimizing the number of rows of E with a non-zero entry
(i.e. minimize the number of sensors which are estimated to
be attacked). It is assumed in [4] that the (possibly altered)
sensor measurements Y, applied actuation U, mapping φ,
and worst-case uncertainty ∆ are provided.
C. Implementation strategy
We employ a model-centric approach to develop and
implement the state estimator. In the case study, the LandShark vehicle is running the ROS middleware [8]. In ROS,
a control system is built as a collection of periodic or
aperiodic nodes that communicate via a publish/subscribe
mechanism. We use the tool ROSLab [9] to describe the
architecture of the control system. We model the resilient
state estimator as a single periodic node that publishes
speed estimates and subscribes to individually published
sensor streams. The node invokes the platform-independent
step function that solves the optimization problem in (1).
The solver is generated using the CVXGEN tool [10].
ROSLab generates a ROS wrapper for the step function that
introduces subscribers and publishers according to the model
of the state estimator node, and invokes the state estimator
periodically at the rate specified in the model.
IV. A SSURANCE C ASE FOR THE L ANS S HARK R ESILIENT
S PEED E STIMATOR
A. Overall assurance case structure
The top-level claims of the assurance case are shown in
Figure 4. The argument is partitioned into two parts. One
part is concerned with the algorithmic correctness of the
state estimator. We refer to this part of the assurance case as

Figure 4.
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the control-level argument, since it deals with mathematical
models of the estimator and relies on control-theoretic
reasoning about these models. The other part addresses the
implementation of the state estimator algorithm and the way
it is deployed on the LandShark platform.
The argument also specifies assumptions and the implementation context. We rely on three categories of assumptions. Attack assumptions represent our model of the
attacker capabilities. We consider attacks on sensor data
and do not restrict the attacker’s capability to manipulate
a stream of sensor data. However, we assume that less
than half of the redundant sensors are attacked. We have
three sensors that provide speed data and thus assume that
no more than one is attacked at any time. Given that the
LandShark platform has three speed sensors, we assume
that at most one sensor can be compromised at any time.
There is no direct way to prove that this assumption holds,
since it describes the limitation on the capability of the
attacker. Indirect justification for the attack model can be
derived from the implementation of the control system. In
particular, sensors are implemented as different ROS nodes
and publish their readings on separate ROS topics, making it
more difficult for an attacker to compromise multiple sensor
streams. Environmental assumptions describe the intended
operating environment of the vehicle. These assumptions are
used in evaluating the accuracy of the model of LandShark
dynamics. We generally assume that the robot is operated on
dry, almost level surface and is driving in an almost straight
line. These assumptions can be validated in deployment,
when deciding whether the robot is fit for a given mission.
Finally, platform assumptions and the implementation context deal with the properties of the LandShark platform.
Here, we assume a certain sampling frequency, expected
latency of sensing and actuation, maximum actuation jitter
(that is, deviations from periodic application of the control
output to actuators), etc. These assumptions need to be
validated on the platform and, if an assurance case for the

whole vehicle is constructed, should correspond to claims
made in other parts of the assurance case.

The structure of the control-level argument is shown in
Figure 5.
Main control-level claim: The first control-level claim,
immediately derived from the top-level claim of the assurance case, is that the resilient state estimation algorithm
achieves bounded state estimation. The algorithm operates
on a relation between measurements, inputs, and the state
of the system. The algorithm requires that less than half of
the sensors are compromised, thus our attack assumptions
match the expectations of the algorithm. The evidence for
algorithm correctness is the proof published in [4]. The proof
is constructed under the condition that the system model
has bounded parametric uncertainty. The remainder of the
argument concentrates on the system model, targeting the
uncertainty of the model and its accuracy with respect to
the real LandShark vehicle. For this, we move to the next
claim in the argument.
Claims about optimization constraint: We claim that
(a) the mapping φ and uncertainty ∆ in (1) describes the
sampled dynamics of the LandShark platform with acceptable accuracy and (b) the uncertainty ∆ is bounded. For
sub-claim (a), we demonstrate how the mapping φ and ∆
can be derived from parameters of a discrete-time model of
the LandShark. The evidence used in this step is the analysis
provided in [4], which explicitly states the linear mappings
and transformations required to generate φ and the elements
of ∆ from the discrete-time model,
yk = Cxk + vk .

ẋ(t) = Ac x(t) + Bc u(t) + wc (t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + vc (t)

B. Control-level arguments

xk+1 = Axk + Buk + wk

following continuous-time model

(2)

where yk and uk denote the sensor measurements and
actuator inputs at time step k, A, B, and C are the state
gain, input gain, and measurement gain, respectively, and
wk and vk are the process and measurement uncertainty.
Furthermore, for sub-claim (b) we demonstrate that when
wk and vk are bounded, then ∆ is also bounded. The
evidence used in this sub-claim is also provided in the
analysis in [4].
Claims about discrete-time model: Here, we claim that
the discrete-time model in (2) describes the dynamics of the
LandShark platform with acceptable accuracy. For the claim
we demonstrate how the parameters of the model, A and B,
as well as process and discretization disturbance terms wk
and vk are derived from parameters of a continuous-time
model of the LandShark. The evidence used in this step
is the analysis provided in [4], which follows closely the
mathematics in [11] and [12]. This analysis states that, with
proper initialization, the outputs of the discrete-time model
in each step, are identical to the sampled outputs of the

(3)

In the remainder of this document, we will refer to the model
in (3) as the reduced-order continuous-time model.
Claims about the reduced-order continuous-time
model: We claim that the reduced-order continuous-time
model in (3) represents the dynamics of the LandShark
platform with sufficient accuracy; however, the model is
an approximate representation of the LandShark dynamics
and its parameters cannot be directly tied to the parameters
of the vehicle. Employing accurate reduced-order models
provides two benefits in resilient estimation: elimination
of non-observable model modes, and reduction in run-time
computational requirements. The argument, therefore, proceeds by establishing an approximate bisimulation between
the reduced-order model in (3) and a full-order continuoustime model, denoted as
˙
x̃(t)
= Ãc x̃(t) + B̃c u(t) + w̃(t)
(4)
y(t) = C̃x̃(t) + ṽ(t)
The theory of approximate bisimulation of linear systems is
described in [13] and is supported by the tool Matisse.2
Claims about the full-order continuous-time model:
The full-order model in (4) is derived from first principles
and reflects the actual design of the LandShark platform. We
obtain the model by noting that the movement of a skidsteering vehicle, such as the LandShark, can be modeled
using first-principle physics following the mode-switching
dynamics as described in [15], such that the elements of the
full-order continuous-time state vector, x̃, are written as

>
x̃ = l θL θR v FL ωL iL FR ωR iR
(5)
where l and v denote the LandShark linear position and
speed, FL and FR are the left and right tractive forces, and
θL , ωL , ıL (θR , ωR , ıR ) are the left (right) DC motor position, angular velocity, and current, respectively. Since there
are multiple state-space representations for the LandShark
platform, our selection of a first principles representation
is based on ensuring that the parameters in the governing
differential equations are either known (i.e. constants or
provided via datasheets), or can be accurately estimated
over the entire operating range. When all the first principle
models are derived from known parameters and accurately
estimated parameters, we claim that the resulting full-order
continuous-time model is acceptably accurate.
The requirement that the unknown parameters for each
first-principles differential equation be estimated over the
entire operating range is crucial in validating the claim
2 In the case study, bisimulation analysis has not been performed. Instead,
we constructed the reduced-order model by identifying the dominant
eigenvalues of (4) [14].

Figure 5.
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that the model is acceptably accurate. As an example, we
consider the first-principles differential equation for the leftside LandShark DC motor3 , namely


r
1
αiL − ωL BL − FL + L
(6)
ω̇L =
J
gr
where α, J, r, gr are the current-to-torque ratio, angular
moment of inertia, the tire radius, and the drivetrain gear
ratio and all are available via the LandShark datasheets4 ;
however, the drivetrain rotational resistance, BL , and model
noise L are not provided through the datasheet and must be
accurately estimated. Estimation of BL and L is achieved in
a laboratory setting by lifting the LandShark off its wheels
(such that FL = 0), and applying the entire operating
range of current, iL , to the motor, and measuring, for each
current setting, the angular velocity, ωL , using a tachometer
at steady state (such that ω̇L = 0). The resulting equation
relating the current, iL , steady-state angular velocity, ωL ,
rotational resistance, BL , and model noise, L , is written as
ωL =

α
1
iL +
L
BL
BL

(7)

Observing that (7) is a linear equation, we can accurately
identify unknown parameters BL and L from the applied
current and measured rotational velocity, by choosing BL
such that the slope is a best fit, and L as the worst-case
error bias.
C. Implementation-level arguments
In addition to claiming that the RSE algorithm achieves
the desired goal, we also need to argue that the algorithm
is correctly implemented and deployed on the LandShark
platform. This part of the argument is given in Figure 6.
The strategy is to separate the argument into two subclaims. The first one covers the platform-independent implementation of the RSE algorithm, implemented as a step
function periodically invoked by the platform. The second
3 A similar differential equation governs the right-side LandShark DC
motor, just with (potentially) different parameter values.
4 See http://www.blackirobotics.com/LandShark UGV UC0M.html and
http://www.thunderstruck-ev.com/Manuals/PMG132curve.pdf.

Figure 6.
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sub-claim considers the deployment of the step function
within a platform-specific wrapper, which handles periodic
invocation of the step function, its connection to the streams
of sensor data, and makes speed estimates available to
other modules in the system. Arguments for both sub-claims
are instances of the model-manipulation strategy. The step
function is obtained using the CVXGEN tool, which generates embedded solvers for optimization problems. From
our perspective, CVXGEN is trusted code base, and we
use its widespread use as evidence. For the model subclaim, we show that the model used by CVXGEN represents
the optimization problem in (1), which can be determined
by model reviews. The wrapper for the step function is
produced from the architectural model of the LandShark
platform, which captures ROS topics and their respective
publishers and subscribers. The wrapper generator has been
implemented in Coq and supplies a proof that (a) the
wrapper subscribes to the sensor topics as specified in the
architectural model, and that subscribed values are passed
to the parameters of the step function, and also that (b)
the step function is invoked with the period specified in the
architectural model. We use this proof as evidence for the
technique sub-claim, and perform review of the architectural
model as evidence for the model sub-claim.

V. D ISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have considered an approach to construct an assurance
case for a specific property of the resilient state estimation
module in a control system of an autonomous vehicle. The
assurance case is intended to be used as a part of a larger
assurance case for the whole vehicle. This overall assurance
case is the subject of an on-going multi-institutional project
funded by the DARPA HACMS program. Some of the
platform assumptions made in our argument will eventually
be claims delivered by other parts of the overall assurance
case.
Our approach to the construction of the assurance case is
motivated by the understanding that the outcome of modelbased development of a system is only as good as the
model used in the process. Therefore, in each step of the
argument we argue that not only we apply sound model
analysis and correct model transformations, but also that
models we operate on are adequate representations of the
reality. To this end, we established a chain of reasoning
from the first-principles model of the vehicle, which is
directly tied to the measurements on the device, all the
way to the model used in the state estimation algorithm,
demonstrating that the accuracy of the model is preserved
in each transformation step. In practice, some of these steps,
along with the associated argument, are left implicit. For
example, it may be possible to start with a discrete-time
model of the vehicle, which would be obtained by system
identification. In this case, we rely on the expertise of control
engineers and common practices of control design to ensure
the accuracy of the model. However, we believe that firstprinciples analysis and reasoning is adding confidence in the
argument and makes evaluation of the argument easier.
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